First Tunisia, then Egypt, now Libya…. Which country is next? – That is the question most often heard in discussions about events unfolding rapidly in the Islamic world.
Which one? Georgia – some voices of the Georgian political opposition or self-described “experts” boldly proclaim.
“It is too early to say,” responded China’s late Prime-Minister Zhou Enlai when asked his assessment of the French Revolution that had taken place two centuries earlier. Never mind that two weeks have barely passed since Mubarak stepped down and one can hardly begin to assess whether what has happened in Egypt is or is not even a revolution. Already some Georgian politicians are leaping to far-reaching conclusions, their hopes up in the ionosphere and their ears pressed to the ground listening for the footsteps of an approaching revolution – maybe it will break out in spring?
They are all ears, waiting – their expectations are great.
Threatening to do away with this government by riding the protest wave that started in Africa, these politicians, nolens volens, admit their own inadequacies. Indeed, what else but a process commenced on another continent could possibly achieve the result they themselves have so completely failed to achieve on their own initiative? Some Saakashvili opponents go even further and project their inadequacy onto all of Georgian society – they declare that the revolutionary process cannot be imported into Georgia because “people are useless” here. Not so long ago these very people were jubilant about the defeat of Victor Yushchenko in Ukraine and Kurmanbek Bakiyev in Kyrgyzstan, labeling the victory of color revolution adversaries as triumphs of democracy.
No one knows how events will unfold in Tunisia, Egypt or in any other country of the Islamic world. Anyone who says otherwise is either delusional or a liar. The only thing that is clear at this time is that the “patriarchs” of North Africa and Middle East are now experiencing the sort of “autumn” Eduard Shevardnadze experienced in November 2003.
There was also considerable speculation about what would happen next – when and how the authority that came to power on the wave of the Rose Revolution might end. As Winston Churchill once said, foretelling the future and explaining afterwards why it didn't happen is a beloved occupation of politicians. Conspiracy theories about ties between the Rose Revolution and George Soros, Americans and/or aliens from other planets aside, the only plausible narrative that has been put forth to explain what has already happened – the events of November 2003 – is that the Rose Revolution was the somewhat delayed sequel to the velvet revolutions of Eastern Europe.
I disagree with this narrative and will explain my reasons why.
As defined by the noted Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington, a revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values of a society, political institutions and a political course.
For revolution to happen, change in the political system alone is not enough; it requires social transformation or, modernization of the society as well. No revolution can be accomplished without this — military coups, revolts, wars of independence, yes, but not revolution. That is why it is premature to assess developments in North Africa and the Middle East. We have yet to learn whether or not social transformation – transformation from a traditional to a modern society – will actually take place.
Depending on the degree of modernization of a society in which a revolution has taken place, one can distinguish two types of revolution – political and social. A political revolution results in further democratization of a modernized society. A social revolution implies, along with democratization, the transformation of a less-developed society.
Developments of the 1980s in Central Europe are examples of political revolutions. This is established by the social and economic state of Central Europe during the Cold War era. A modern-type urban society there was ruled by a violent system imposed from outside. That society was sufficiently modernized to consolidate quickly into a new political system – a liberal democracy.
Urbanization indicators also pointed to a high development level of Central European societies. For example, at the time the Soviet Union disintegrated, the rural population of the Czech Republic comprised only 25 percent of the entire population (the corresponding indicator of Georgia was twice as many rural as urban inhabitants).
The standard of living in the Baltic States before the Soviet occupation was comparable to that of Scandinavian countries. The generation that lived in the Baltic States prior to the Soviet occupation was still alive at the time the Socialist Bloc tore apart. That is why the change in the political regime after the breakup of the Soviet Union was much less painful in each of those countries than it was in other former U.S.S.R. states.
A social revolution is a far more difficult process. It deals with an underdeveloped society that needs to undergo a social transformation along with the political one. In this process, not only political forces, but various social groups as well, oppose each other.
The conflict between city and village is especially conspicuous. Many will recall that, during the time of first President of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the dissatisfaction of the then-elite was nourished by class contempt toward the so-called “tent-ladies” who assembled in front of the Parliament to support the president, rather than by, for example, the failure of the president to carry out privatization or land reform. The same is happening today: the so-called “elite” — residents of the prestigious central district of Tbilisi – are unhappy that “villagers” have come to power. The most figurative expression of this attitude – “the barbarians are coming” – was coined by former Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili and instantly become a catch phrase.
In reality, the success of a revolution depends on the extent of involvement of new social groups (say, “villagers”) in the administration of the country, as well as on the capacity of the ruling force to ensure the involvement of new social groups and to create an institutional environment accommodating their interests.
Gamsakhurdia failed to do that. He was not given enough time to accomplish many things. The first president was not able to replace a narrow ethnic nationalism with an inclusive civil national ideal. Instead of implementing fundamental reforms, he squandered what little time he had, stewing in his own juices and butting heads with representatives of his own social circle – nomenclature intelligentsia.
During his rule, Gamsakhurdia did not launch any land reform; he did not disband collective farms, but merely renamed them “national farms.” He did not abolish price controls or take any steps toward privatization. In his speeches, the first Georgian president talked about state capitalism and questioned the very idea of private ownership.
Because of the first president’s attitude toward reform, the urban middle class and the rural population – those who had supported Gamsakhurdia in his fight against the communist nomenklatura – received nothing during the years of his rule and became disillusioned.
Opponents of Gamsakhurdia also gained strength because of his failure to fundamentally change the system of public service. Vital institutions remained largely controlled by Soviet nomenklatura. The nomenklatura system, first and foremost, was used by Russian special services as its support base, which helped set the stage for the civil war, the reign of terror by paramilitary groups and rampant organized crime.
A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values of a society, political institutions and a political course.
In contrast to Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze, who made his comeback via coup d'état, managed to survive for more than a decade even though his legitimacy was questioned and to some extent crippled by supporters of Gamsakhurdia. The former First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party succeeded by meeting the minimum interests of various social groups.
Under Shevardnadze, the process of privatization started – some received land, others flats, some misappropriated plants, others opened up cooperatives. Some people thrived on theft and graft. A grand master of intrigue, Shevardnadze managed to annihilate the Mkhedrioni and other paramilitary groups, thereby gaining the image of a stability guarantor.
Stabilization of the situation bore fruit – the political awareness of the population rose. Citizens were no longer afraid of Mkhedrioni, but grew annoyed with corrupt employees of the road police. People received ownership rights, but became frustrated with the widespread practice of paying bribes to register property.
Shevardnadze ultimately failed to meet the new and growing demands of the population. He was not able to build political institutions that could guide a social and economic transformation and integrate various social groups into the political process. The second president of Georgia also lacked sufficient power to effectively thwart the process. On his way from “stability to welfare,” Shevardnadze found himself at a dead end.
That is precisely what created fertile ground for the revolution.
Those who believe the Rose Revolution happened on 23 November 2003 are wrong. In fact, that date only marks the beginning of the revolution. Saakashvili has named George Washington, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and David Ben-Gurion as the paragons to emulate. What these starkly different statesmen have in common is something that poses a challenge for Georgia – modernization of a half-agrarian country and, after a 200-year break, creation of a nation-state based on liberal democracy. Neither Vaclac Havel nor Lech Walesa, the leaders of Central European velvet revolutions, faced such a challenge.
The question of just how revolutionary the Rose Revolution is has yet to be answered. Although many painful reforms have been implemented, the social transformation is not finished yet. The future will show whether Saakashvili will succeed in following his exemplary statesmen in actions and results, and not just in rhetoric.
Although true that not all goals of the Rose Revolution have been achieved, we can confidently say that the road to those goals has become irreversible – the genie has already been released from its bottle and cannot be put back. Participation of new social groups in political processes has already been broadened.
Today every social group, no matter how happy or unhappy with this government, is trying to realize its interests within the system established as a result of the Revolution. That explains the fact that the anti-systemic part of the political opposition lacks social support.
For a new revolution to happen, the mere efforts of politicians who are willing to topple the government are not enough. It requires a social group being out of play. Today only the former elite consider themselves in such a situation – they lament about being stripped of “dignity.” By dignity, they mean those privileges they lost with the departure of Shevardnadze.
These elite do not fight for participation but crave their lost exclusive status. They are dismayed by involvement in the process of those whom they deride as “villagers” and “barbarians” interlopers they want to keep “in their own place.”
An attempt to reduce the participation of social groups is, in essence, not a revolution but a counterrevolution. No resource for counterrevolution exists inside the country. The only possibility is Moscow. The only possible scenario – not Cairo 2011, but Prague 1968.
